What is Religion?

What is Religion?

What is Religious? Well it is Hard to say Exactly”

Educators who teach about religion immediately face the problem of defining the subject. Is a "religion" to be regarded as another form of human thought or opinion covered by guarantees of freedom, as is speech, assembly, press and so on? Or, does religion always imply supernaturalism?

There are further questions. Should the definition simply refer to those who feel that they are in a particular relationship to God (however defined) with an obligation to fulfill divinely revealed law? For example, Judaism is always listed as a "religion," but what about Humanistic Judaism,[1] which focuses on persons and humanity without reference to a deity? In addition, many Secular Humanists [2] tend to eschew the term "religion" because, in its popular interpretation, it carries with it overtones of a supernaturalism that they reject.

What does the word "religion" mean, and what is religion and what is nonreligion?

A Starting Place

The root of the word "religion" is usually traced to the Latin religare (re: back, and ligare: to bind), so that the term is associated with "being bound." The idea may reflect a concept prominent in biblical literature. Israel was said to be in a "covenant" (berith) relationship with its God (Yahweh). In a sense, the nation was "covenanted" or "bonded" to the deity. But what does being bound or bonded mean? Is a slave who is bound or bonded to his or her master in a "religious" relationship? Is a business agreement which binds partners in a legal covenant a form of "religious" binding? At one time in human history, such "bindings" may have had religious sanction, but today, in America, slavery is outlawed and business contracts are made in legal settings. This particular notion of religion as "binding" doesn't really fit and therefore this interpretation of the root meaning of the term proves not to be particularly helpful.

On the other hand, one might argue that the religious person is one "bound" by choice or by commitment to the tenets of a particular faith system. Once again, the parameters of this definition can be broadened to include any commitment to a particular way of life. Such an expansion would embrace concepts like "philosophy" or "psychology" or even any chosen way of living. One's religion then becomes "how one lives one's life" or "how one lives in the light of a particular commitment" or, in popular vernacular, one's "life style." Obviously, while the term "commitment" may provide some insight into the concept of "being bound," it is far too inclusive to be acceptable.

The Notion of Faith

Religion may embrace a conception of "faith," and it is not uncommon to find mention of the "faiths of humankind." The reference is generally to that to which individuals or groups are loyal, to that in which trust is placed. Theologian H. Richard Niebuhr[3] pointed out that, when a patriotic nationalist might claim

"I was born to die for my country" he is exhibiting the double relationship that we now call faith. The national life is for him the reality whence his own life derives its worth. He relies on the nation as source of his own value. He trusts it; first, perhaps, in the sense of looking constantly to it as the enduring reality out of which he has issued, into whose ongoing cultural life his own actions and being will merge. His life has meaning because it is part of that context, like a word in a sentence. It has value because it fits into a valuable whole. His trust may also be directed toward the nation as a power which will supply his needs, care for his children, and protect his life. But faith in the nation is primarily reliance upon it as an enduring value-center. Insofar as the nation is the last value-center to which the nationalist refers, he does not raise the question about its goodness to him or about its rightness or wrongness. Insofar as it is value-center rightness and wrongness depend on it. This does not mean in any Hobbesian sense that for such faith the national government determines what is right and what is wrong but rather that the rightness of all actions depends on their consonance with the inner constitution of the nation and on their tendency to enhance or diminish national life, power, and glory. (p. 17)

"Value-center," "trust," "loyalty," "meaning" are intertwined to provide the definition of "faith" or "a faith." It is not difficult to understand that, whereas a theist may express such a faith in a god, an atheist or a humanist may also claim to have such a value-center that gives meaning and direction to life. This value-center would be a faith in the possibilities and potentials of "humanity." Inasmuch as many religions have humanistic concerns and dimensions, there will be overlaps in outreach to those in need and in the interpretation of meaningful response. Whereas the religious person may respond to human need because his or her faith system calls for such response, the humanist will respond out of the well-springs of compassion. The responses may be the same or paralleled, but the motivations will emerge from different value-centers.

Those who accept and those who do not accept supernaturalistic beliefs will enjoy the same or similar feelings of awe and wonder as they view a sunset, a magnificent forest, or the broad rolling prairies; or as they listen to the quieting murmur of a brook, the lapping of waves of a lake or ocean, or the soughing of wind in the tree tops; or as they witness the fury of an electric storm, a hurricane, or a tidal wave. The difference will be in the interpretations. The supernaturalist will interpret these experience with reference to a deity, the nonsupernaturalists will see them as manifestations of nature. The experiences will be the same or paralleled; the interpretations will differ. Perhaps both can be interpreted as "spiritual" experiences — in one case with supernaturalistic overtones; in the other resonating with wonder and awe, but without the supernatural.

Struggling for Definition

It is not surprising to discover that most present day scholars tend to avoid definitions when they discuss religions. The reasons for evasion become obvious as we look at some of the many earlier efforts to define the term. For example, in his Gifford Lectures (1902), the psychologist William James [4] defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (p. 42). Obviously, this definition is too limited; religion is more than affect and more than what people do in their solitariness. As William Newsman [5] pointed out: "regardless of what else may be said of religion, it is also a social phenomenon — it is something that people do in groups." (p. 3) Mircea Eliade [6], the Roman Catholic historian of religions, rejected the study of religions solely from psychological or sociological perspectives and sought to examine the patterns or forms of religious expression. He would separate the sacred from the profane, even though he recognized that religion has the capacity to transform the profane into the sacred. (p. 30) The Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich [7], wrote of religion in terms of "ultimate concern" within which he would include secularism: "For secularism is never without ultimate concern." (p. 124) The sociologist, Emile Durkheim [8] , linked religion to the concept of "church:" "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them." (p. 47) Obviously, this definition runs counter to the recognition of the ascetics who express their beliefs outside of a community.

Into this struggle for definition, others have introduced a number of special terms. … For example, Rudolph Otto [9] in The Idea of the Holy produced a battery of Latin terms that suggest aesthetic dimensions in religion. He wrote of human confrontation with the "numinous," which is "wholly other" or outside normal experience and which is indescribable, terrifying, fascinating, characterized by dread and awe. The experience is of a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, an "awe-filled and fascinating mystery." He wrote of the numen tremendum, which refers to the sense of the uncanny or that which renders a person "awestruck." All of these feeling responses he associated with religion. However, these terms refer to reactions not unlike those expressed by astronomers as they are awestruck, fascinated and moved by the immensity of space; or by our cosmonauts when, with deep emotion and fascination, they viewed the earth from space; or by poets and artists as they struggle to articulate the wonder they experience in everything from nature to human technological creativity; and by paleontologists and other scientists as they confront the mysterious beginnings of life on planet earth. As we noted above, some of us experience similar feelings as we view the majesty of the mountains, the beauty of a sunset, the power of the ocean, the deepest chasm in the crust of the earth, or the shaking of the earth during an earthquake or violent storm. These are human aesthetic responses to the wonders of our cosmos. They are not limited to "true believers" nor are they necessarily to be defined as "religious," although some would accept the term "spiritual," indicating the deep emotional stirrings evoked, but without any supernaturalistic implications.

Nor is it possible to link religion in a singular way to values, as Ames has done in his definition of religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values" [10, p. 11]. Values rise out of society and can exist quite apart from religion. Religion is not alone in seeking meaning for existence. Joseph Gaer [11] described religion as a person’s thoughtful response to the question "why?" This implies that religion alone seeks meaning for existence. But philosophy, psychology and the sciences also pose this question. Nor can religion be linked simply to "impulse directed to the conservation and preservation of life," as Jane Harrison [12] phrased it. And the list goes on and on.

The question arises: How does one handle this problem? Perhaps the answer lies in "no definition."

Forging Ahead

John A. Hutchinson [13], in his book Paths of Faith, acknowledged the difficulty in defining religion. He wrote:

Formal definitions of religion are as numerous, as various, and often as mutually conflicting as there are students of religion. Often such definitions illustrate the oriental parable of the blind men describing the elephant, each taking hold of part of the beast and defining the whole in terms of this part. Like the elephant, religion is a large and complex phenomenon. In this connection, some historians of religion question or reject the word religion as a distortion of the form of experience it seeks to communicate. Several of the world's major languages lack any word that can be adequately translated as "religion." The common noun religion imputes a unity or homogeneity of experience that many observers believe does not exist. (pp. 3-4)

Hutchinson goes on to point out that substituted words do not work. However, he then attempts his own definition of the "ultimate valuation" experience—something at once particularly universal and yet so multifarious and multifaceted that its definition is elusive. The available terminology is inadequate, though, and satisfactory definition eludes even Hutchinson.

Given that we generally recognize and acknowledge that the development of religion is a particularly human endeavor, then we can follow a pattern set by those who simply discuss "religions" without becoming entangled in debates over precise definitions.

Religions include aspects of all of the themes mentioned above.