3. အၿမဲတမ္း သင္ယူေလ့လာေနပါ။ ကြန္ပ်ဴတာအေၾကာင္း၊ ဥယ်ာဥ္စိုက္ပ်ိဳးျခင္းအေၾကာင္း၊ လက္မႈပညာအေၾကာင္း၊ ဘာကိုပဲ ျဖစ္ျဖစ္ သင္ယူေလ့လာေနဖို႔ လိုအပ္ပါတယ္။ ဦးေႏွာက္ကို ဘယ္ေတာ့မွ အနားမေပးပါနဲ႔။ စကားပံုေတာင္ ရွိေသးတယ္ မဟုတ္လား.. ဘာတဲ့ An idle mind is the devil's workshop တဲ့ ေနာက္ဆက္တြဲအေနနဲ႔ကေတာ့ The devil's name is Alzheimer's! ပဲေပါ့
The 1st Fourth Buddhist Council (Theravada tradition) was held in response to a year in which the harvests in Sri Lanka were particularly poor, and many monks subsequently died of starvation. Because the Pali Canon was in that time solely remembered by heart, the surviving monks recognized the danger of not writing the teachings of the Tipitaka down, so that even if some of the monks (whose duty it was to study and remember parts of the Tipitaka for later generations) died, the teachings would not be lost. This Fourth Buddhist Council took three years.
The Fourth Buddhist Council was held in Tambapanni (Sri Lanka) under the patronage of King Vattagamani. The main reason for its convening was the realization that it was now not possible for the majority of monks to retain the entire Tipitaka in their memories as had been the case formerly for the Venerable Mahinda and those who followed him soon after. Therefore, as the art of writing had, by this time developed substantially it was thought expedient and necessary to have the entire body of the Buddha's teaching written down.
King Vattagamani supported the monk's idea and a council was held specifically to commit the entire Tipitaka to writing, so that the genuine Dhamma might be lastingly preserved. To this purpose, the Venerable Maharakkhita and five hundred monks recited the words of the Buddha and then wrote them down on palm leaves. This remarkable project took place in a cave called, the Aloka lena, situated in the cleft of an ancient landslip near what is now Matale. Thus the aim of the Council was achieved and the preservation in writing of the authentic Dhamma was ensured. In the Eighteenth Century, King Vijayarajasiha had images of the Buddha created in this cave.
After the Council, palm leaves books appeared, and were taken to other countries, such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. The Tipitaka and its commentaries were originally brought to Sri Lanka by the missionary monk Mahinda of the Third Buddhist Council.
What is Religious? Well it is Hard to say Exactly”
Educators who teach about religion immediately face the problem of defining the subject. Is a "religion" to be regarded as another form of human thought or opinion covered by guarantees of freedom, as is speech, assembly, press and so on? Or, does religion always imply supernaturalism?
There are further questions. Should the definition simply refer to those who feel that they are in a particular relationship to God (however defined) with an obligation to fulfill divinely revealed law? For example, Judaism is always listed as a "religion," but what about Humanistic Judaism,[1] which focuses on persons and humanity without reference to a deity? In addition, many Secular Humanists [2] tend to eschew the term "religion" because, in its popular interpretation, it carries with it overtones of a supernaturalism that they reject.
What does the word "religion" mean, and what is religion and what is nonreligion?
A Starting Place
The root of the word "religion" is usually traced to the Latin religare (re: back, and ligare: to bind), so that the term is associated with "being bound." The idea may reflect a concept prominent in biblical literature. Israel was said to be in a "covenant" (berith) relationship with its God (Yahweh). In a sense, the nation was "covenanted" or "bonded" to the deity. But what does being bound or bonded mean? Is a slave who is bound or bonded to his or her master in a "religious" relationship? Is a business agreement which binds partners in a legal covenant a form of "religious" binding? At one time in human history, such "bindings" may have had religious sanction, but today, in America, slavery is outlawed and business contracts are made in legal settings. This particular notion of religion as "binding" doesn't really fit and therefore this interpretation of the root meaning of the term proves not to be particularly helpful.
On the other hand, one might argue that the religious person is one "bound" by choice or by commitment to the tenets of a particular faith system. Once again, the parameters of this definition can be broadened to include any commitment to a particular way of life. Such an expansion would embrace concepts like "philosophy" or "psychology" or even any chosen way of living. One's religion then becomes "how one lives one's life" or "how one lives in the light of a particular commitment" or, in popular vernacular, one's "life style." Obviously, while the term "commitment" may provide some insight into the concept of "being bound," it is far too inclusive to be acceptable.
The Notion of Faith
Religion may embrace a conception of "faith," and it is not uncommon to find mention of the "faiths of humankind." The reference is generally to that to which individuals or groups are loyal, to that in which trust is placed. Theologian H. Richard Niebuhr[3] pointed out that, when a patriotic nationalist might claim
"I was born to die for my country" he is exhibiting the double relationship that we now call faith. The national life is for him the reality whence his own life derives its worth. He relies on the nation as source of his own value. He trusts it; first, perhaps, in the sense of looking constantly to it as the enduring reality out of which he has issued, into whose ongoing cultural life his own actions and being will merge. His life has meaning because it is part of that context, like a word in a sentence. It has value because it fits into a valuable whole. His trust may also be directed toward the nation as a power which will supply his needs, care for his children, and protect his life. But faith in the nation is primarily reliance upon it as an enduring value-center. Insofar as the nation is the last value-center to which the nationalist refers, he does not raise the question about its goodness to him or about its rightness or wrongness. Insofar as it is value-center rightness and wrongness depend on it. This does not mean in any Hobbesian sense that for such faith the national government determines what is right and what is wrong but rather that the rightness of all actions depends on their consonance with the inner constitution of the nation and on their tendency to enhance or diminish national life, power, and glory. (p. 17)
"Value-center," "trust," "loyalty," "meaning" are intertwined to provide the definition of "faith" or "a faith." It is not difficult to understand that, whereas a theist may express such a faith in a god, an atheist or a humanist may also claim to have such a value-center that gives meaning and direction to life. This value-center would be a faith in the possibilities and potentials of "humanity." Inasmuch as many religions have humanistic concerns and dimensions, there will be overlaps in outreach to those in need and in the interpretation of meaningful response. Whereas the religious person may respond to human need because his or her faith system calls for such response, the humanist will respond out of the well-springs of compassion. The responses may be the same or paralleled, but the motivations will emerge from different value-centers.
Those who accept and those who do not accept supernaturalistic beliefs will enjoy the same or similar feelings of awe and wonder as they view a sunset, a magnificent forest, or the broad rolling prairies; or as they listen to the quieting murmur of a brook, the lapping of waves of a lake or ocean, or the soughing of wind in the tree tops; or as they witness the fury of an electric storm, a hurricane, or a tidal wave. The difference will be in the interpretations. The supernaturalist will interpret these experience with reference to a deity, the nonsupernaturalists will see them as manifestations of nature. The experiences will be the same or paralleled; the interpretations will differ. Perhaps both can be interpreted as "spiritual" experiences — in one case with supernaturalistic overtones; in the other resonating with wonder and awe, but without the supernatural.
Struggling for Definition
It is not surprising to discover that most present day scholars tend to avoid definitions when they discuss religions. The reasons for evasion become obvious as we look at some of the many earlier efforts to define the term. For example, in his Gifford Lectures (1902), the psychologist William James [4] defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (p. 42). Obviously, this definition is too limited; religion is more than affect and more than what people do in their solitariness. As William Newsman [5] pointed out: "regardless of what else may be said of religion, it is also a social phenomenon — it is something that people do in groups." (p. 3) Mircea Eliade [6], the Roman Catholic historian of religions, rejected the study of religions solely from psychological or sociological perspectives and sought to examine the patterns or forms of religious expression. He would separate the sacred from the profane, even though he recognized that religion has the capacity to transform the profane into the sacred. (p. 30) The Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich [7], wrote of religion in terms of "ultimate concern" within which he would include secularism: "For secularism is never without ultimate concern." (p. 124) The sociologist, Emile Durkheim [8] , linked religion to the concept of "church:" "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them." (p. 47) Obviously, this definition runs counter to the recognition of the ascetics who express their beliefs outside of a community.
Into this struggle for definition, others have introduced a number of special terms. … For example, Rudolph Otto [9] in The Idea of the Holy produced a battery of Latin terms that suggest aesthetic dimensions in religion. He wrote of human confrontation with the "numinous," which is "wholly other" or outside normal experience and which is indescribable, terrifying, fascinating, characterized by dread and awe. The experience is of a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, an "awe-filled and fascinating mystery." He wrote of the numen tremendum, which refers to the sense of the uncanny or that which renders a person "awestruck." All of these feeling responses he associated with religion. However, these terms refer to reactions not unlike those expressed by astronomers as they are awestruck, fascinated and moved by the immensity of space; or by our cosmonauts when, with deep emotion and fascination, they viewed the earth from space; or by poets and artists as they struggle to articulate the wonder they experience in everything from nature to human technological creativity; and by paleontologists and other scientists as they confront the mysterious beginnings of life on planet earth. As we noted above, some of us experience similar feelings as we view the majesty of the mountains, the beauty of a sunset, the power of the ocean, the deepest chasm in the crust of the earth, or the shaking of the earth during an earthquake or violent storm. These are human aesthetic responses to the wonders of our cosmos. They are not limited to "true believers" nor are they necessarily to be defined as "religious," although some would accept the term "spiritual," indicating the deep emotional stirrings evoked, but without any supernaturalistic implications.
Nor is it possible to link religion in a singular way to values, as Ames has done in his definition of religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values" [10, p. 11]. Values rise out of society and can exist quite apart from religion. Religion is not alone in seeking meaning for existence. Joseph Gaer [11] described religion as a person’s thoughtful response to the question "why?" This implies that religion alone seeks meaning for existence. But philosophy, psychology and the sciences also pose this question. Nor can religion be linked simply to "impulse directed to the conservation and preservation of life," as Jane Harrison [12] phrased it. And the list goes on and on.
The question arises: How does one handle this problem? Perhaps the answer lies in "no definition."
Forging Ahead
John A. Hutchinson [13], in his book Paths of Faith, acknowledged the difficulty in defining religion. He wrote:
Formal definitions of religion are as numerous, as various, and often as mutually conflicting as there are students of religion. Often such definitions illustrate the oriental parable of the blind men describing the elephant, each taking hold of part of the beast and defining the whole in terms of this part. Like the elephant, religion is a large and complex phenomenon. In this connection, some historians of religion question or reject the word religion as a distortion of the form of experience it seeks to communicate. Several of the world's major languages lack any word that can be adequately translated as "religion." The common noun religion imputes a unity or homogeneity of experience that many observers believe does not exist. (pp. 3-4)
Hutchinson goes on to point out that substituted words do not work. However, he then attempts his own definition of the "ultimate valuation" experience—something at once particularly universal and yet so multifarious and multifaceted that its definition is elusive. The available terminology is inadequate, though, and satisfactory definition eludes even Hutchinson.
Given that we generally recognize and acknowledge that the development of religion is a particularly human endeavor, then we can follow a pattern set by those who simply discuss "religions" without becoming entangled in debates over precise definitions.
Religions include aspects of all of the themes mentioned above.
This term means "indefinite." The rules in this section do not assign definite or fixed penalties, but instead give procedures by which the Community may pass judgment when a bhikkhu in uncertain circumstances is accused of having committed an offense. There are two training rules here.
1. Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman on a seat secluded enough to lend itself to sexual intercourse, so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen them, might describe it as constituting any of three cases — entailing defeat, communal meetings, or confession — then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat there, may be dealt with in line with any of the three cases — entailing defeat, communal meetings, or confession — or he may be dealt with in line with whichever case the female lay follower whose word can be trusted described. This case is indefinite.
Woman here means a female human being, "even one born that very day, all the more an older one." To sit also includes lying down. Whether the bhikkhu sits down when the woman is already seated, or the woman sits down when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference here.
Private means private to the eye and private to the ear. Two people are sitting in a place private to the eye when no one else is near enough to see if they wink, raise their eyebrows, or nod . They are in a place private to the ear when no one else is near enough to hear what they say in a normal voice . A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door, a large bush, or anything at all that would afford them enough privacy to engage in sexual intercourse.
For a bhikkhu to sit in such a place with a woman can be in itself a breach of see the explanations for that rule and affords the opportunity for breakingandas well — which is why this case is called indefinite.
If a trustworthy female lay follower happens to see a bhikkhu with a woman in such circumstances, she may inform the Community and charge him on the basis of what she has seen. Female lay follower here means one who has taken refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. Trustworthy means that she is at least a stream-winner. Even if she is not a stream-winner, the Community may choose to investigate the case anyway; but if she is, they have to. The texts do not discuss cases in which a man is making the charge but, given the low legal status of women in the Buddha's time, it seems reasonable to infer that if a woman's word was given such weight, the same would hold true for a man's. In other words, if he is a stream-winner, the Community has to investigate the case. If he isn't, they are free to handle the case or not, as they see fit.
The wording of the rule suggests that once the matter is investigated and the bhikkhu in question has stated his side of the story, the bhikkhus are free to judge the case either in line with what he admits to having done or in line with the trustworthy female lay follower's charge. In other words, if his admission and her charge are at variance, they may decide which side seems to be telling the truth and impose a penalty — or no penalty — on the bhikkhu as they see fit.
The Vibhaṅga, however, states that they may deal with him only in line with what he admits to having done. The Commentary offers no explanation for this point aside from saying that in uncertain cases things are not always as they seem, citing as example the story of an arahant who was wrongly charged by another bhikkhu of having broken .
Actually, the Vibhaṅga in departing from the wording of the rule is simply following the general guidelines the Khandhakas give for handling accusations. Apparently what happened was that this rule and the following one were formulated early on. Later, when the general guidelines were first worked out, some group-of-six bhikkhus abused the system to impose penalties on innocent bhikkhus they didn't like , so the Buddha formulated a number of checks to prevent the system from working against the innocent. We will cover the guidelines in detail under the adhikaraṇa-samatha rules in , but here we may note a few of their more important features.
As explained under , if Bhikkhu X is charged with an offense, the bhikkhus who learn of the charge are duty-bound to question him first in private. If he admits to having done as charged, agrees that it is an offense, and then undergoes the penalty, nothing further need be done . If he admits that he did the act, but refuses to see that it is an offense or to undergo the penalty, then if the act really did constitute an offense, the Community may meet and suspend him . The Khandhakasshow that "not seeing an offense" does not mean that one denies doing the act; simply that one does not agree that the act was against any of the rules.
If, however, X denies the charge, and yet some of the members of the Community suspect him of not telling the truth, the issue has to go to a formal meeting. Once the case reaches this stage, one of only three verdicts is possible: that the accused is innocent, that he was insane at the time he committed the offense and so absolved of guilt, or that he is not only guilty as charged but — for having dragged out his confession to this point — also deserves a further-punishment transaction , which is the same as a censure transaction .
When the Community meets, both the accused and the accuser must be present, and both must agree to the case's being heard by that particular group. If the original accuser is a lay person, one of the bhikkhus is to take up the charge. The accused is then asked to state his version of the story and is to be dealt with in accordance with what he admits to having done .shows that the other bhikkhus are not to take his first statement at face value. They should press and cross-examine him until they are all satisfied that he is telling the truth, and only then may they pass one of the three verdicts mentioned above.
If necessary, they should be prepared to spend many hours in the meeting to arrive at a unanimous decision, for if they cannot come to a unanimous agreement, the case has to be left as unsettled, which is a very bad question mark to leave hovering over the communal life. The Commentary tosuggests that if one side or the other seems unreasonably stubborn, the senior bhikkhus should lead the group in long periods of chanting to wear down the stubborn side.
If a verdict is reached but later discovered to be wrong — the accused got away with a plea of innocence when actually guilty, or admitted guilt simply to end the interrogation when actually innocent — the Community may reopen the case and reach a new verdict (Cv.IV.8). If a bhikkhu — learning that a fellow bhikkhu actually was guilty and yet got away with a verdict of innocence — then helps conceal the truth, he is guilty of an offense under .
Obviously, the main thrust of these guidelines is to prevent an innocent bhikkhu from being unfairly penalized. As for the opposite case — a guilty bhikkhu getting away with no penalty — we should remember that the laws of kamma guarantee that in the long run he is not getting away with anything at all.
Although these guidelines supercede both aniyata rules, the rules still serve two important functions:
1) They remind the bhikkhus that charges made by lay people are not to be lightly ignored, and that the Buddha at one point was willing to let the bhikkhus give more weight to the word of a female lay follower than to that of the accused bhikkhu. This in itself, considering the general position of women in Indian society at the time, is remarkable.
2) As we will see under , it is possible under some circumstances — depending on the bhikkhu's state of mind — to sit alone with a woman in a secluded place without incurring a penalty. Still, a bhikkhu should not blithely take advantage of the exemptions under that rule, for even if his motives are pure, his actions may not appear pure to anyone who comes along and sees him there. These rules serve to remind such a bhikkhu that he could easily be subject to a charge that would lead to a formal meeting of the Community. Even if he were to be declared innocent, the meeting would waste a great deal of time both for himself and for the Community. And in some people's minds — given the Vibhaṅga's general rule that he is innocent until proven guilty — there would remain the belief that he was actually guilty and got off with no penalty simply from lack of hard evidence. A bhikkhu would thus be wise to avoid such situations altogether, remembering what Lady Visākhā told Ven. Udāyin in the origin story to this rule:
"It is unfitting, venerable sir, and improper, for the master to sit in private, alone with a woman... Even though the master may not be aiming at that act, cynical people are hard to convince."
Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika, saṅghādisesa, or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.
2. In case a seat is not sufficiently secluded to lend itself to sexual intercourse but sufficiently so to address lewd words to a woman, should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman on such a seat, so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen them, might describe it as constituting either of two cases — entailing communal meetings or confession — then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat there, may be dealt with in line with either of the two cases — entailing communal meetings or confession — or he may be dealt with in line with whichever case the female lay follower whose word can be trusted described. This case too is indefinite.
This rule differs from the preceding one mainly in the type of seat it describes — private to the eye and private to the ear, but not secluded. Examples would be an open-air meeting hall or a place out in the open in sight of other people but far enough away from them so that they could not see one wink, etc., or hear what one is saying in a normal voice. Such a place, although inconvenient for committing would be convenient for committing . As a result, the term woman under this rule is defined as under those rules: one experienced enough to know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd.
Otherwise, all explanations for this rule are the same as for the preceding rule.
Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a saṅghādisesa or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.
.jpg)
